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J:AOK R. STEIN et al., Respondents, v. RUSSELL BROWN
SIMPSON, .Appellant.

- '
Who· Seeks Equity· Must Do Equity.A .plaintiff may be required to do enuity in some>eases
although d:til£endant. could n 0t have obtained .such equity by
independent ·action or as the· acting party.
[2] Id~ 'Maxims:......He' Who. Seekw Equity Must Do EquitY:.-In
• applying the maxim that· ''IH~ who. seeks equity must d? equity,"
the ~ourt does not cre&te substantive rights when the one who
invokes the l:na:xim has none.
Subrogation~Persons .Entitled.---The principle on which subrogation is founded.applies·where . one.per.soil, nota volun,teer,
pays a debt for which imother is primarily answerable, .and
w~i~h, ill equity and good conscience; should havebeen discliarged by the latter.···
[ 4] ld:---:-}Jer~Onfi E~~itled-'-Lienh9lders;:_Where .a . ju:ttior . lienhol!ler pay~ the depj;secur~dby a senior lieJI to );!~otect .his
interest, .he b.~com~s su~rogated to. the rights .of the ~!)nior
Hen~ol~er as aga~nst the. property. owner, although. he takes no.
assignment of the !)enio:r lien.
·xd.~Person:s Entitled---Volunteers.-The d()ctiine; of s~bro
. g~ti<ln i~ inappli~ltble ~p One who, in paying anOther's ·debt,
!l'~t~ as a volunteer or ()fficJous intermeddler, b~t it may .be
invoked by one who makes such payment to protect an interest
of his own.
~d."-Persons. Entj.tl~d---:-Li!lnholders.__,A person who dis~harges
a lien 2noj;i~c]lrre{l}Jy.him o~ property not hisown, ,hut. whieh
he mistakenly belilifes to he his, may he subrogated to the
righ t!l. <>f the. lien4olaer..
!d.-Persons Entitled:_Liel1hold!lrs.-A ·Junior lienhol4er <Ja'll7
not be said to have discharg~d .the supe:t;io:r lien, in the II1~s,
taken belief that he then .had an interest in the property
wh(lr~, with~ut reason, he. pre;viously refused tender of the
full amount of his Mbt,
.
'

~' '

,,

'

''

ll:quity"""-::1\iaxims~He

[l]..See 10 Q~l.J1lr;>508;19 A111.Jur. 319:
L3] See. 23 Oal.Jur. 918; 50 Am.Jur. 696.
[ 4] ~ight of junior en:eumbfancer<who disch~rges prier lien .t.o
be subrogated•toadditional se.(lurity heldbyseniorlienor, .note, 145
A.J:,.R. 738. See,also, 23 Cal.Jnr. 928; 50 .Am.Jur, 699, 746. ·
lVIcK. Dig, Referen,ces: [1, ~] Equity, §!;l9; 13, 5] Subr()gat~()n,
§4; [4, 6, 7] Subrogation,• § 9; [8] Restitutioi.l; [9] Quieting Title,
§114; [10] Judgments, §513; [11] Appeal and Error, §110.
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[8] Restitution-Unjust Enrichment.-Property owners are not
unjustly enriched by failure to require them to reimburse a
junior lienholder who discharged a superior lien as part of his
fraudulent scheme to obtain the property for less than its
value.
[9] Quieting Title-Judgment.-A judgment, in a quiet title
action, adjudging that plaintiffs are not entitled to damages
under specified provisions of the Civil Code, but adjudging
them owners in fee of the property and adjudging also that
defendants have no right, title or interest in the property, and
that plaintiffs' title thereto is quieted and is free and clear of
any lien, incumbrance or claim in favor of defendant, conditioned on payment to defendant within a specified time after
entry of judgment of a sum of money less costs, adequately
sets .forth plaintiffs' rights.
[lOa, lOb] Judgments-Payment-Tender.-Plaintiffs do not lose
their rights under a judgment quieting title in them on condition that they pay defendant a sum of money, by their failure
to make such payment where they make a timely tender,
demanding satisfaction of the judgment, and where defendant's
refusal thereof, based on his theory that such satisfaction
would deprive him of his right to appeal, is without justification, such payment not being put in jeopardy by the appeal.
[11] Appeal-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Acceptance of
Bene:fits.-The rule that acceptance of benefits under a judgment foreclo~es the right to appeal therefrom has no application where appellant is admittedly entitled to the benefits, or
where they would not be affected or put in jeopardy by the
appeal.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ben V. Curler, Judge.* Affirmed.
Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Joseph D. Taylor and John W. Hill for Appellant.
Cobb & Utley and Ernest R. Utley for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment quieting
plaintiffs' title to real property on the condition that they
pay defendant Simpson $12,000, less costs, within 30 days
from notice of entry of the judgment. Simpson claims the
amount payable should be $28,911.87.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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From the unchallenged findings of fact the following appears. Plaintiffs were the owners of property having a value
of over $50,000. It was encumbered by a first trust deed
securing a debt owed to Hollywood State Bank amounting to
$18,000. Simpson loaned $20,000 to plaintiffs and demanded
and received therefor two notes, each for $22,000, the additional $2,000 on each being a bonus demanded by Simpson.
The notes called for interest at 7 per cent. One of the notes
was secured by a second trust deed on the property and the
other by a chattel mortgage on the furniture. At Simpson's
request the notes were made payable to a third party, Simons
(an employee of Simpson) who was to and did assign them to
Simpson. (That was an attempt to avoid a claim of usury.)
Each of the notes was payable in monthly installments of
$2,000 from August 24, 1946, to January 24, 1947, when the
balance became due. The $2,000 bonus was usurious interest
charged by Simpson. Plaintiffs paid $8,000 on the notes,
reducing the principal to $12,000, in accordance with the
notes and a subsequent understanding in which additional
interest amounting to $240 was to be paid. Various proper
tenders of the balance due were made by plaintiffs or their
agent to Simpson or his agent and refused. Simpson gave
notice of default and election to sell, and the sale of the property under the trust deed was scheduled for July 23, 1947.
It was continued from time to time at Simpson's request to
September 10, 1947, at 10 a. m. An hour before the sale,
plaintiffs offered to pay the full amount which Simpson claimed
was then due, and Realty Title Company, Simpson's agent
for collection from plaintiffs, and trustee under the trust deed,
advised plaintiffs that $16,641.13 was all that was required.
Thereupon, and still before the sale, plaintiffs made a cash
tender to Simpson of $17,000. The tender was refused, Simpson stating that he was interested in acquiring the property,
not the money. The sale proceeded, Simpson bidding $36,000
and plaintiffs' agent, Bassett, $50,000. Bassett having only
$17,000 in cash with him, the title company, at Simpson's
request, declared "all bids off" and started a new sale. The
title company then announced that Simpson had paid the
plaintiffs' debt to the Hollywood State Bank under the first
trust deed in the sum of $17,380.85, and hence the sale would
be for the amount represented by both trust deeds. Simpson
had paid the bank the amount due on the first trust deed the
morning of the sale. Bassett's request for a 24-hour postponement of the sale to obtain funds to cover his $50,000 bid was
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refused at Simpson's direction. The sale proceeded, Bassett
bidding $17,000 and Simpson $18,000. The property was sold
to Simpson. The court found the sale invalid; that the amount
owed by plaintiffs to Simpson under said notes and trust deeds
was $12,000 and that amount is due without interest.
The foregoing facts are undisputed, and with the other facts
found, depict a shocking and unconscionable course of conduct by Simpson.
The court also found: ''That in the payment to the Hollywood State Bank of the sum of $17,380.85 in satisfaction of
its first trust deed, Simpson did not secure from the bank an
assignment of said indebtedness, and his aforesaid satisfaction
of said bank's note and trust deed was not disclosed to plaintiffs either at the time of their aforesaid redemption tender on
said date or prior to the time Bassett had bid the sum of $50,000
for said property.
''That the Trustee's sale under Simpson's second trust deed
advertised said property for sale subject to the Hollywood
State Bank's first trust deed; that no one had demanded of
Simpson the payment of said first trust deed and there was
no reason appearing which would have then required Simpson
to have paid and satisfied the bank's first trust deed in order
that Simpson's interest might be protected; that Simpson had
no property interest to protect at the time which would have
required payment of the indebtedness due the bank and in
paying and satisfying the bank's first trust deed, Simpson
was a volunteer and Simpson's act and conduct in paying
and satisfying the bank's first trust deed was only for the
reason of springing a surprise upon plaintiffs and to enable
him to acquire the property in question for himself at said
Trustee's sale and at a price far below the real value of said
property.'' Simpson does not question the factual matters
in the finding last quoted, but asserts that the finding that he
was a volunteer and had no interest to protect, is a conclusion
of law.
Simpson's contention is that he was not a volunteer; that
he had an interest to protect, and that, therefore, he is entitled
to have repaid to him the amount he paid the bank ($17,380.85)
in addition to the $12,000. His claim is that "he who seeks
equity must do equity" ( 10 Cal.J ur. 508), hence plaintiffs,
who are seeking equity, must pay the amount he paid the bank.
[1] It is true that the maxim applies, and a plaintiff may
be required to do equity in some cases, though defendant could
not have obtained such equity by independent action or as
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the acting party. (Dool v. First National Bank, 207 Cal. 347
[278 P. 233]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 P. 258,
L.R.A. 1915C 492]; Pomeroy's Equity Jur., (5th ed.) § 386a).
[2] It is also true, however, that in the application of that
maxim the court does not create substantive rights under
the guise of doing equity, that is, it does not confer rights when
the one who invokes it has none (Rosenberg v. Lawrence,
10 Cal.2d 590 [75 P.2d 1082] ; Lande v. Jurisich, 59 Cal.App.2d
613 [ 139 P .2d 657] ) or as has been stated: ''With respect to
the terms which may be imposed upon the party as a condition
to his obtaining the relief in accordance with the rule,-that
is, the 'equity' which he must do,-it is undoubtedly true, as
said by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, that the court obtains no
authority from this principle to impose any arbitrary conditions not warranted by the settled doctrines of equity jurisprudence; the court cannot deprive a plaintiff of his full
equitable rights, under the pretense of awarding to the defendant something to which he has no equitable right, something
which equity jurisprudence does not recognize. The principle
only requires the plaintiff to do 'equity.' According to its true
meaning, therefore, the terms imposed upon the plaintiff, as
the condition of his obtaining the relief, must consist of the
awarding or securing to the defendant something to which he
is justly entitled by the principles and doctrines of equity,
although not perhaps by those of the common law,-something
over which he has a distinctively equitable right." (Pomeroy's
Equity Jur. (5th ed.), § 386.)
[3] The right which Simpson claims he is entitled to have
plaintiffs accord him here, in claiming equity, is that of subrogation. ''The principle upon which the right of subrogation is founded applies in all cases in which one person, not
a volunteer, pays a debt for which another is primarily
answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience, should
have been discharged by the latter." (23 Cal.Jur., p. 918.)
And the rule has found express application with reference
to payment by a junior lien holder of a senior lien on the same
property. "Every person, having an interest in property
subject to a lien, has the right to redeem it from the lien,
at any time after the claim is due, and before his right of
redemption is foreclosed, and, by such redemption, becomes
subrogated to all the benefits of the lien, as against all owners
of other interest in the property, except in so far as he was
bound to make such redemption for their benefit." ( Civ.
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Code, § 2903.) "One who has a lien inferior to another, upon
the same property, has a right:
'' 1. To redeem the property in the same manner as its
owner might, from the superior lien; and
'' 2. To be subrogated to all the benefits of the superior lien,
when necessary for the protection of his interests, upon satisfying the claim secured thereby." ( Civ. Code, § 2904.)
[ 4] It is the general rule that where the holder of a junior
lien on property pays the debt secured by a senior lien to
protect his interest, he thereby becomes subrogated to the rights
of the senior lienholder as against the owner of the property,
even though he takes no assignment of the senior lien. (Diehl
v. Hanrahan, 68 Cal.App.2d 32 [155 P.2d 853]; Swain v.
Stockton Savings etc. Soc., 78 Cal. 600 [21 P. 365, 12 Am.St.
Rep. 118] ; 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, §§ 23, 103.)
[5] As appears from the rule of subrogation, the one invoking it must not have, in making the payment, been a
volunteer-an officious intermeddler, or affirmatively he must
have had some interest to protect. (See authorities cited
supra; Guy v. Dtt Uprey, 16 Cal. 195 [76 Am.Dec. 518];
McMillan v. O'Brien, 219 Cal. 775 [29 P.2d 183]; Richards v.
Griffith, 92 Cal. 493 [28 P. 484, 27 Am.St.Rep. 156] ; Bowman
v. Sears, 63 Cal.App. 235 [218 P. 489] ; 23 Cal.Jur. 919; Rest.,
Restitution, § 162; 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, § 21; Pomeroy's
Equity Jur. (5th ed.), § 1212.)
Simpson does not dispute that at the time he paid the bank's
trust deed his security-trust deed interest in the property was
extinguished by reason of plaintiffs' tenders of payment. Thus
it would appear he had no interest in the property when he
paid the bank. He asserts, however, that he must have had
an interest in the property, otherwise the court would not have
required plaintiffs to pay the $12,000 due on their indebtedness
to him. That is not persuasive, for he cannot complain if
he obtained more than he should have, if that is the case.
[6] In this same connection, he further argues that he
thought he had an interest and that a payment of a superior
lien by one under a mistaken belief that he has an interest to
protect is not a volunteer. It has been held that where a person
discharges a lien not incurred by him on property not his
own, but which he mistakenly believes to be his, is subrogated
to the rights of the lienholder. (Walker v. Walker, 138 Tenn.
679 [200 S.W. 825]; Minchew v. Hankins (Tex.Civ.App.), 278
S.W. 306; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 401 [9 N.E. 799] ;
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Detroit &; Northern Michigan Bldg. &; Loan Assn. v. Oram,
200 Mich. 485 [167 N.W. 50]; F~~ller v. Harwell, 126 Cal.App.
654 [15 P.2d 562].)
In Fu.ller v. Harwell, supra, 126 Cal.App. 654, property
owned by Sue Harwell was subject to a mortgage given by
her. Plaintiff had a judgment against her husband, T. J,
Harwell, and levied execution on the property. On demand
of the mortgagee he paid the mortgage. It was held that he
was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. In response to
the contention that plaintiff never had an execution lien on
the property as it did not belong to the judgment debtor, and
that, therefore, he was a mere volunteer with no right of
subrogation to the mortgagee, the court held that he was
subrogated, stating that an ''apparent interest'' of the judgment debtor is sufficient to support an "honest endeavor" to
protect his asserted lien where he paid the mortgagor under
the ''compulsion'' that he would have had to release his lien
unless he did. Also, in the other cases cited supra, a point
is made as to the honest belief and endeavor on the part of the
claimed lienholder to protect his interest. It has been said
in speaking of subrogation where a junior lienholder pays a
senior lien: " . . . the plaintiff is not officious, and he uses
his property or his property is used in discharging the obligation of another or a lien upon another's property, he is entitled
to reimbursement and is entitled to the remedy of subrogation
to obtain reimbursement. The plaintiff is not officious where
he makes the payment under a mistake, or where he is induced
to make the payment by fraud or by duress (see §§ 43, 54).
He is not officious where he was under a duty to make the
payment, as for example where he was a surety (see § 76).
He is not officious where he makes the payment to protect
an interest of his own, as for example where the holder
of a junior encumbrance discharges a prior encumbrance in
order to prevent foreclosure (see § 104). The plaintiff is not
officious where his property is used by another without his
consent in discharging an obligation of the other or a lien
upon the other's property (see § 207)." (Rest., Restitution,
§ 162, com. b.)
[7] Here it appears from the foregoing quoted finding
that Simpson did not obtain an assignment from the bank;
he failed to disclose his discharge of the bank's trust deed until
the sale under his trust deed; the sale of the property was
advertised as for the default on his trust deed; that no demand
was made that he pay the bank and there was no reason which
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would have required him to pay it; and that his conduct in
respect to paying it and otherwise was to enable him to acquire
the property for less than its value, rather than protect any
supposed interest of his. Under those circumstances there
was no mistake on his part of law or fact that he had to pay
the bank to protect his interest or that he had any interest
to protect. It is hardly credible that a person who has been
tendered the full amount of the debt owed him and without
reason refuses the tender, can be said to believe mistakenly
that he has any further interest except the aim of obtaining
the property for less than its value.
[8] Simpson urges, however, that where a plaintiff must
do equity to obtain equitable relief, defendant's motive is
immaterial; that even though he was a volunteer and guilty
of wrongful conduct, plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if
they are not required to reimburse him for his discharge of
the bank's trust deed. It is said: "A person who without
mistake, coercion or request has unconditionally conferred
a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution, except
where the benefit was conferred under circumstances making
such action necessary for the protection of the interests of the
other or of third persons." (Rest., Restitution, § 112.) Further : ''A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another
is not entitled to restitution therefor." (I d., § 2.) We believe
those principles are applicable to a defendant who seeks to
have an equity granted to him. Plaintiff is not "unjustly"
enriched when the cause of the benefit conferred was the
wrongful conduct of defendant.
We think that Simpson's conduct was fraudulent, either
aetually or constructively or at least tantamount to fraud,
that is, an endeavor to unlawfully obtain plaintiffs' property
for less than its value. It was more than merely having a bad
motive. It was a fraudulent scheme carried to fruition by
Simpson, and only the intervention of the court by this action
prevented its full realization. The cases such as Bateman v.
Kellogg, 59 Cal.App. 464 [211 P. 46]; Olivero v. Rosano,
42 Cal.App.2d 740 [109 P.2d 976]; Wolfe v. Titus, 124 Cal.
264 [56 P. 1042]; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burke, 151 Cal. 616
[91 P. 504] ; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra, 162 Cal. 366; and
Dool v. First National Bank, supra, 207 Cal. 347, cited by
Simpson are not in point.
[9] Simpson asserts that the judgment is not clear that
plaintiff's title is quieted, subject to the payment of the $12,000,
less costs. It reads: "IT Is ... AD.JUDGED . . . that plain-
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tiffs are not entitled to damages under and pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 2941 and 3294 of the Civil Code of
the State of California.
"IT Is . . . ADJUDGED • . . that plaintiffs . . . are the
owners in fee [of the property].
''That the defendants, or either of them, have no right,
title or interest therein, and no lien or encumbrance of any
nature or kind therein, and that plaintiffs' title to their said
real property is quieted, and is free and clear of any lien or
encumbrance or claim in favor of the defendant Russell Brown
Simpson, the quieting of said title to said real property is
conditioned upon the payment to the defendant, Russell Brown
Simpson, of the sum of $12,000.00 less allowed costs herein,
within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of notice
of entry of this judgment and decree.'' We believe it is clear
enough and adequately sets forth Simpson's rights.
[lOa] Finally, Simpson asserts that plaintiffs have lost their
right under the judgment to have their title quieted because
they failed to pay the $12,000 less costs within 30 days after the
notice of entry of judgment as provided in the judgment.
It appears that a tender was made within the time, but that a
satisfaction of the judgment was demanded by plaintiffs.
Simpson refused the tender on the basis that if he gave a
satisfaction he would lose his right to appeal. [11] The
general rule is that the acceptance of benefits under a judgment will foreclose the right to appeal therefrom. (Schubert
v. Reich, 36 Cal.2d 298 [223 P.2d 242]; 2 Cal.Jur. 229.)
However, ''The rule has no application where the benefits
accepted are such that appellant is admittedly entitled to them
or would not be affected or put in jeopardy by the appeal.''
(Schubert v. Reich, s1tpra, 300.) [lOb] All that Simpson
is asking is that the judgment be modified so as to require
payment to him of the $17,380.85, which he paid to the bank in
addition to the $12,000. There is no dispute about the amount
paid to the bank. Plaintiffs do not object to the requirement that the $12,000 be paid to Simpson. Thus, the requirement that $12,000 be paid to Simpson is not put in
jeopardy by this appeal. Hence Simpson should have
accepted that tender and given satisfaction for it. As said
in People v. Roath, 62 Cal.App.2d 241, 246 [144 P.2d 648]:
"From what we have heretofore said it is at once apparent
that respondents' claim in this regard cannot be upheld
because an appellant is not precluded from prosecuting an
appeal from a judgment in his favor when such appeal is
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for the purpose of establishing a greater claim and where, as
here, it affirmatively appears that he is entitled to that which
he has accepted, but is contending for something more . . .
Furthermore, where as in the case at bar, appellant accepted
payment of a part of the judgment which was favorable to it,
but the part adverse to appellant can be reversed without
affecting the part which was favorable, the appellant is not
estopped from prosecuting an appeal from that part of the
judgment which was against it.''
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J ..
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I can understand that the result reached
by the majority deservedly, in a moral sense, punishes Simpson; but I think that in a legal sense it unjustly enriches the
plaintiffs. I can agree with the majority that Simpson paid
the bank loan because he thought that such procedure would
aid him in securing the property at less than its reasonable
value; but I think that it also indubitably appears that in so
doing he labored under a mistake of fact or of law or of both
fact and law.
It seems to me there can be no doubt that Simpson did not
intend to make a volunteer payment for the benefit of another;
he believed that he had, an interest in the property and he
believed that he was protecting and furthering that interest
when he discharged the bank's lien. The bank's lien was
valid; it was a bona fide prior charge against the property
and payment of it protected that property against, and relieved it of, the bank's claim. Such claim of the bank,
existing against the property, was just as much adverse to
plaintiffs as it was to defendant. In fact, with the extinction
of defendant's lien, the lien of the bank was left as more
substantially adverse to plaintiffs than to anyone else.
Simpson thought he was paying off a charge against his own
property; it developed that he paid a charge against plaintiff's
property. Since plaintiffs receive the full benefit of the
payment it seems to me that as a condition of quieting their
title the court should require them to reimburse the payor.
This conclusion appears to me to accord with the cases cited
in the majority opinion.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

